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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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30 August 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR LT. GENERAL C. P. CABELL,
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U) Discussion on Estimate Procedure

1. I am trying to have our estimating effort follow the procedure outlined in the attached discussion.

2. You said you would look it over with the possibility that some variation of it might be helpful to us all in IAC work.

3. If we did have some procedure that forced us all to discuss the evidence in a common language, I believe we would reach agreement more often and more quickly, or identify more clearly why we disagree.

4. Our suggestions regarding Intelligence priorities will use some of the language developed here.

1 Incl
Estimate Procedure
w/Tab "A"

John A. Samford
JOHN A. SAMFORD
Major General, USAF
Director of Intelligence

USAF review(s) completed.

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JOHN A. SAMFORD
Major General, USAF
Director of Intelligence

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ESTIMATE PROCEDURE

1. Our estimating job concentrates upon actions, and upon the factors which support or modify actions.

2. Actions can be of many kinds. Their impact on our interests can be both good and bad. If an action suggests substantial harm to our interests, we make an estimate which labels the action as a threat.

3. Actions can also come from many sources, such as countries, forces, peoples, factions, and individuals.

4. Sometimes we begin our estimating job with the kind of action as well as its possible source. At other times we begin with only the source.

5. The factors which support or modify an action are strengths, motives, judgments, and pressures. The strengths are military, logistic, economic, industrial, political, psychological, and governmental, depending upon the kind of action source involved. For examples of the kinds of action that these strengths can support for a national action source, see Tab "A".

6. If we have in mind the action we want to estimate as well as the possible source, we:

a. Set up the action as an hypothesis.

b. Measure the factors which can support or modify that action (the strengths, motives, and judgment of the source; and the pressures upon that source).

c. Test the action for probability consistent with the factors and state this probability.

7. If we begin with only the source of action, we:

a. Measure the factors as comprehensively as possible to stimulate awareness of all reasonable courses of action.

b. List the actions that the factors suggest.

c. Test each action for probability consistent with the factors and state these probabilities.

8. The above procedure:

a. Eliminates the vagueness of estimates entitled:

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"Developments in such and such 'country or area'".

b. Concentrates attention on what causes conditions rather than the conditions themselves.

c. Provides a working language for discussion and clarification of the evidence.

d. Provides action people with direct measurements of the strengths which they must overcome or alter.

e. Makes individual contributions to all estimates easier to delegate and produce.

f. Makes comprehensive coverage to all the actions that may concern us more likely.

g. Provides a direct means of sensing and establishing intelligence priorities.

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TAB "A"

The strengths of an enemy which clearly enable him to do objectionable things are:

a. Military Strengths -- Obviously to conduct the great variety of military operations that such strengths are prepared for.

b. Logistic Strength -- To place the physical resources of any other strength where they can be used in chosen courses of action. (Used primarily in connection with the resources of military strengths.)

c. Economic and Industrial Strengths -- To enslave the economy of other nations through skillful trade agreements; to reduce the economy of other nations through direct economic competition; to sustain or permit increase in the expenditures of warfare; to outlast the corresponding strengths of other nations as these become strained or exhausted in warfare; and to advance the technology of warfare equal to, or faster, than that of other nations.

d. Political Strength -- To increase and exploit differences between the national aspirations of other nations; to develop or increase suspicion between nations that are allies, or potential allies; to subvert the government and the peoples of other nations through direct infiltration of their governmental machinery; to develop and maintain a convincing posture of benign and competent leadership, both at home and abroad; to coerce other nations by issuing threatening declarations, or ultimatums, and to influence other nations through promises of benefits.

e. Psychological Strength -- To choose any course of action (includes adhering to a choice already made).

f. Governmental or Organizational Strength -- To direct the independent or coordinated use of the military, logistic, economical, industrial, and political strengths of the nation in such courses of action as may be decided upon; and to control the psychological strength as may be required.

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(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	INITIALS	DATE
1 DD/I	DD/I	10.1954
2 DD/NE to draft		
3 Comment		
4		
5 DD/I		

FROM	INITIALS	DATE
1 DEPUTY DIRECTOR	c/c	9/7/54
2		
3		

<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE

Remarks: Gen Sanford passed this to me for comment. Request you comment particularly concerning whether or not there is over -

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*a case for some
standardization such as
is suggested by this, for
use of the Community.
What leadership
opportunity does this
suggest to us?*

CPC

*Request comment by
20 Sept.*